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Abstract
In many countries, personal information that
can be published or shared between organi-
zations is regulated and, therefore, documents
must undergo a process of de-identification to
eliminate or obfuscate confidential data. Our
work focuses on the de-identification of legal
texts, where the goal is to hide the names of
the actors involved in a lawsuit without losing
the sense of the story. We present a first evalu-
ation on our corpus of NLP tools in tasks such
as segmentation, tokenization and recognition
of named entities, and we analyze several eval-
uation measures for our de-identification task.
Results are meager: 84% of the documents
have at least one name not covered by NER
tools, something that might lead to the re-
identification of involved names. We conclude
that tools must be strongly adapted for pro-
cessing texts of this particular domain.
1 Introduction
For publication of data containing personal infor-
mation, preservation of people’s privacy must be
considered. For example, this is the case of docu-
ments in the domain of health, where the results
of clinical studies, medical procedures and de-
tected pathologies are considered confidential in-
formation, or in the legal domain, where names
of minors of age or primary offenders should be
preserved. In fact, in many countries publica-
tion of sensitive data is regulated and can lead to
legal sanctions (Repu´blica Oriental del Uruguay,
2008; Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services,
United States of America, 1996; Parlamento Eu-
ropeo y Consejo de la Unio´n Europea, 2016). The
protection of privacy comes in conflict with the
availability and use of this information by the sci-
entific community or the general public. As a
paradigmatic case, we can mention the informa-
tion on medical treatments where, due to its vol-
ume, research can be supported with statistical
methods.
In order to publish information with sensitive
data, processes of de-identification, or anonymiza-
tion, are investigated and developed. The goal
of these systems is to remove or obfuscate data
that allow the individualization of people or insti-
tutions. This process of de-identification is often
done manually: a costly task, both in time and in
human resources, and without guarantees of a to-
tally reliable result (Sweeney, 1996).
When the data are in relational databases, k-
anonymization algorithms are usually applied,
while the problem is different when the informa-
tion is found in a free text or, even, images (Ba-
yardo and Agrawal, 2005; Domingo-Ferrer et al.,
2013; Gardner et al., 2008; Heatherly et al., 2016;
Newhauser et al., 2014; Karle and Vora, 2017;
Patil et al., 2017; Zhang et al., 2014; Friedrich
et al., 2019; Li et al., 2018; Dernoncourt et al.,
2016). Increasing the difficulty of the problem,
sensitive names of people, companies or hospitals
are contained within a narrative that is not always
grammatical sound.
In the latter case, Natural Language Processing
(NLP) techniques might be applied for automatic
or semi-automatic anonymization of texts. The de-
tection of different entities make the process of de-
identification closely related to the tasks of Recog-
nition of Named Entities (NER) and to the reso-
lution of coreferences, although it is not exempt
from its own peculiarities (Aramaki et al., 2006).
2 De-identification of legal texts
Our work focuses on the particular problem
of named entity de-identification in legal texts,
which, as shown below, adds the additional task
of stringing of coreference chains (Mamede et al.,
2016) to the entity detection problem. To ex-
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emplify, let’s consider a fragment of a legal sen-
tence1:
Que ninguno de los funcionarios de la dependen-
cia, incluso el Comisario a cargo constataron u
observaron algu´n tipo de conducta fuera de lugar
del Sr. Juan Pe´rez. Que la denuncia fue real-
izada por la Sra. Marı´a Rodrı´guez que es quien
lideraba la Ca´rcel y ordenaba a las dema´s (. . . )
Que lo u´nico admitido por el Sr. Pe´rez es que
compro´ un chip a la Sra. Juana Ferna´ndez, pero
no por eso se lo puede acusar de abuso y mucho
menos de violacio´n.
That none of the officials of the dependency, including the Commissioner
in charge, stated or observed any type of misplaced conduct by Mr. Juan
Pe´rez. That the complaint was made by Mrs.Marı´a Rodrı´guez who leads
the jail and ordered the others (. . . ) that the only thing admitted by Mr.
Pe´rez is that he bought a chip from Mrs. Juana Ferna´ndez, but that does
not mean he can be accused of abuse and much less of rape.
For the de-identification of named entities, the
simplest solution consists of completely eliminat-
ing the information, replacing it by some generic
label like ”X”, similar to striking out names on a
printed document. This procedure, although ef-
fective for hiding names, does not allow to dis-
tinguish between the different actors, making it
difficult, if not impossible, to interpret the story
correctly. For example, in our example, if both
“Marı´a Rodrı´guez” and “Juana Ferna´ndez“ are re-
placed by an X, it would be difficult to interpret
that the lady that made the complaint is not the
same as the one that sold the phone chip.
To avoid this problem, mentions are replaced by
fantasy names or just a generic label, associated in
a unequivocal way to each actor in the text. This
last method is used, for example, in our corpus
where the labels are fictitious initials: AA, BB,
etc. In our previous example, mentions “Mr. Juan
Pe´rez” and “Mr. Perez” are replaced by “Mr. AA”
since both refer to the same person.
In return, the process of de-identification is now
more complex: it is no longer enough to detect
and suppress all names; consistency must be main-
tained in assigning the new labels to the origi-
nal actors, which implies the resolution of coref-
erences, at least between the different variants of
proper names.
This task presents its difficulties. For example,
consider the following excerpts taken from a sen-
tence of the Family Court of Appeals:
1All the examples of this article come from our corpus;
names are replaced by fantasy names to preserve anonymity
1. Jorge Martı´nez, Juan Lı´ber c/ Pe´rez Rodrı´guez, Pedro
y otros.
Jorge Martı´nez, Juan Lı´ber against Pe´rez Rodrı´guez, Pedro and others
2. (. . . ) Sres. Pedro y Juan Pe´rez, deduce recursos de
apelacio´n.
(. . . ) Misters Pedro y Juan Pe´rez, deduct appeals.
3. No puede considerarse que Pedro Pe´rez ha omitido
contestar la demanda(. . . )
It can not be considered that Pedro Pe´rez has omitted to answer the demand(. . . )
4. (. . . ) el Sr. Pedro Pe´rez por haber precluido la oportu-
nidad procesal para promoverla(. . . )
(. . . ) Mr. Pedro Pe´rez for having precluded the procedural opportunity to promote
it (. . . )
5. (. . . ) en donde Pedro Pe´rez Rodrı´guez denuncio´ que
su domicilio era (. . . )
(. . . ) in which Pedro Pe´rez Rodrı´guez denounced that his domicile was (. . . )
6. Se intimo´ la aceptacio´n de Pedro a fs. 32 vta. y a Juan
a fs. 36/37 (. . . )
It was asked the acceptance of Pedro in fs. 32 vta. and Juan in fs. 36/37 (. . . )
It must be taken into account that, for the sub-
stitution process, “Pe´rez Rodrı´guez, Pedro”, “Pe-
dro” and “Pedro Pe´rez Rodrı´guez” (fragments 1,
2, 5 and 6) refer to the same person, “Juan Pe´rez”
and “Juan” (fragments 6 and 2) refer to another. In
particular, from the fragment 2 it is inferred, from
the plural “Misters” and the distribution property
of the conjunction and, that the aforementioned
“Pedro” has “Pe´rez” as surname, while in the frag-
ment 6 it must be assumed that “Pedro” and “Juan”
are the same “Pe´rez” brothers because they are the
only ones mentioned with those given names in
that piece of text.
3 Corpus
Our corpus consists of a part of the National Ju-
risprudence Base, composed of circa 79 000 doc-
uments, of which about 17 000 are manually de-
identified. This gives us, a priori, a parallel corpus
to work with, from which we can, for example,
train a machine learning model or evaluate exist-
ing tools. Unluckily, many of these 17 000 doc-
uments have failures in their anonymization pro-
cess: there are names left out or labels incorrectly
assigned to actors .
With the purpose of establishing a gold standard
we proceeded to the revision of 1 000 documents,
identifying and labeling manually all the entities
to be de-identified with the aid of BRAT (Stene-
torp et al., 2012). A total of 10 102 entities dis-
tributed in 997 documents are manually tagged,
while 3 documents are finally discarded because
they do not contain entities to de-identify. We use
these 1 000 documents for evaluating state of the
art tools: Freeling (Padro´ and Stanilovsky, 2012),
CoreNLP (Manning et al., 2014), Nltk (Bird and
Klein, 2009) and Spacy (Honnibal and Montani,
2017).
All tested NLP tools present issues process-
ing our corpus due to its characteristics which
differentiates them from journalistic or scientific
texts (the usual kind of text these tools are trained
with). The problems detected appear in the early
stages of what is a standard text analysis: the an-
alyzers make important errors, from tokenization
and segmentation to detection of named entities –
particularly important for our problem–. For ex-
ample, the difference in number of sentences and
tokens detected by Core NLP and Freeling in the
whole corpus is appreciable: close to 100 000 for
the first, 500 000 for the second.
Table 1 contains examples of sentences incor-
rectly marked by three different analyzers, NltK,
Freeling and CoreNLP, over the same set of docu-
ments. From a quantity perspective, the number of
sentences detected is quite different for each ana-
lyzer: Nltk detects 136 sentences, while CoreNLP
finds 87 and Freeling detects only 47. From the
analysis of the results, we detect that periods used
in abbreviations or ordinals are incorrectly man-
aged like with ”7o.”2 (sentence 44), ”Sr.”3 (sen-
tence 56) or ”pa´g.”4 (sentence 108).
There are also problems in the detection of
named entities by all three tools. Figure 1 shows
the result of applying the NER modules of Freel-
ing and CoreNLP, where it can be seen that not
only are the segments incompletely recognized,
but also, there are problems with the types as-
signed to the different entities.
In the understanding that the priority in de-
identification is hiding of all sensitive names, the
recall is measured according to three tools: Freel-
ing, Spacy and CoreNLP. Two cases are consid-
ered: when the entity is detected by the analyzer
completely, with its correct limits (perfect match),
and a second case in which the text segment covers
2Ordinal number, ”7th.”.
3Abbreviation of ”Sen˜or”, ”Mister”.
4Abbreviation of ”pa´gina”, ”page”.
Freeling:
Sentence 44: En el mismo sentido se pronuncio´ el
Tribunal en lo Civil de 7o.
Sentence 45: Turno, cuando en Sentencia No .
134/98 sostuvo que...
CoreNLP:
Sentence 56: Como lo plantea el Sr.
Sentence 57: Fiscal de Corte a fs .
Sentence 58: 183 v., si bien atenie´ndonos ...
Nltk:
Sentence 108: (Nicola´s Coviello, Doctrina Gen-
eral del Derecho Civil, pa´g.
Sentence 109: 78, Cf.
Sentence 110: Eduardo Garcı´a Maynez, Intro-
duccio´n al estudio del derecho, pa´g.
Sentence 111: 329)”
Table 1: Examples of incorrect sentence boundary
recognition by Nltk, CoreNLP and Freeling. Each
group (108-111, 56-58 and 44-45) should belong to
the same sentence even tough they are split by the seg-
menters.
Figure 1: NER by CoreNLP and Freeling; highlighted
words are NER entities (color red for persons) . Both
NER fail to recognize ”XX Cabrera, XX” and ” Mx
XX, Axx” as two references of persons at the beginning
of the text.
Freeling Spacy CoreNLP
Marked ent. 49352 78304 112330
Perfect ent. 7367 7092 4167
Covered ent. 8448 8336 4461
Perfect doc. 121 82 7
Covered doc. 160 118 10
Table 2: Entities detected by Freeling, Spacy and
CoreNLP. Only a fraction of our goal (10102 entites)
is found, even when tools recover more than 50 000 en-
tities of several types.
the whole entity, but includes more text (obscure
match).
The results of the three analyzers are shown in
Table 2. From all 997 documents, only 1%-16%
of the documents get all its entities detected or
completely covered5, and just 7%-12% get all of
their entities recognized. That is, even considering
the most lenient measure, 84% of the sentences
would have at least one name partially left as-is,
risking the re-identification of people involved in
those texts. Therefore, state of the art tools cannot
deal with these kind of text without adjusting and
retraining of their different modules.
4 Measures
For the evaluation of the anonymization systems,
different measures have been proposed depending
on the final goal of the task. Some of these mea-
sures have their origin in Information Retrieval
(IR) –those regarding quantity and quality of the
marked entities–, while others come from the Res-
olution of Coreferences (Mamede et al., 2016) –
those that seek to maintain a unequivocal link be-
tween labels and original names–.
From IR come Precision and Recall and
F1(Manning and Schu¨tze, 1999), in their micro
and macro versions of these measures: for the first
one each instance counts as one entity, for the sec-
ond, each document counts as one.
But Precision and Recall do not take into ac-
count if all the references to the same real entity
are recognized as such, that is, if the coreference
chains are correctly solved by the system. Spe-
cific metrics are proposed for coreference resolu-
tion, where each entity is seen as a set of linked
mentions and it is evaluated how close is the parti-
tion detected by the system of the real sets of enti-
ties present in the text.
Analogous to the micro and macro versions of
P and R, in the measures for the resolution of
coreferences, a distinction is made between those
based on links –each mention in the text has equal
weight, with which entities with more references
weight more than others with fewer– and those
based on instances –each entity has equal weight
regardless of the number of references that occur
in the text–.
Although there are several measures proposed,
there is no consensus on which is the best. Among
5An name is completely covered if a tagged entity com-
prises all of the name’s tokens but possibly more.
P R F
MUC 0.40 0.50 0.44
B3 0.42 0.62 0.50
CEAFΦ3 0.57 0.57 0.57
CEAFΦ4 0.69 0.46 0.55
BLANC – – 0.43
LEA 0.24 0.34 0.31
Table 3: P , R y F for several coreference evaluation
measures over the same example.
the first ones, which arise in the 90s, are MUC and
B3 (Bagga and Baldwin, 1998; Vilain et al., 1995),
although, due to the weaknesses they present,
several alternatives are proposed such as CEAF,
BLANC and LEA (Luo, 2005; Ma`rquez et al.,
2013; Moosavi and Strube, 2016).
For example, consider S as the real set of two
entities, where each entity is represented by the
set of mentions in the text; and T as the output
partition given by the system:
S = {{a1, a2, a3}, {b1, b2, b3, b4}}
T = {{a1, a2}, {a3, b1}, {b3, b4, c1}}
Table 3 shows the result of several measures for
the previous example. As it can be observed, the
values for the problem posed as an example can be
quite different, varying from a minimum of 0.31 to
a maximum of 0.57.
To our knowledge, it does not exist a global
measure for the anonymization task.
5 Conclusions
The first stages of an anonymization project of
sensitive data in legal documents are presented
and discussed, in a context where the interest in
making the information of the sentences publicly
available collides with the right to privacy of peo-
ple involved in the trials. Given a parallel corpus
of 17 000 sentences, our first thought was to ap-
ply supervised learning algorithms with this data.
But an analysis of the performance of the avail-
able tools for some basic needed preprocessing
–tokenization, sentence segmentation, named en-
tities recognition– shows the in-feasibility of this
option and the need to retrain these tools in order
to encompass the legal domain. In addition to the
insufficiency of usual NLP tools, it is also neces-
sary to complement the existing theoretical devel-
opments in terms of joint evaluation measures that
consider at the same time the identification of en-
tities in texts and the construction of coreference
chains. A reflection that arises is if training and
evaluation of NLP tools do not correspond, in fact,
to somewhat simplified data, without enough vari-
ety to allow a more fluid passage to real domains
of application.
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